SCOPUS 정보 검색 플랫폼 - 논문 보기

메뉴 건너뛰기

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 189-207

Unanimity and majority rule: The calculus of consent reconsidered

(1) Guttman, Joel M a

a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY (Israel)

Author keywords

Collective decision rules; Collective decision making; D71; D72; Majority rule; Social choice; Unanimity

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038905591 PISSN: 01762680 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00002-0 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (26)

References (15)

1
- 0003917730
- Wiley, New York
- Arrow, K.J., 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley, New York.
- (1951) Social Choice and Individual Values
- Arrow, K.J.¹

2
- 0004289065
- Univ. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
- Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G., 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Univ. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
- (1962) The Calculus of Consent
- Buchanan, J.M.¹ Tullock, G.²

3
- 0000297156
- On 64%-majority rule
- Caplin A., Nalebuff B. On 64%-majority rule. Econometrica. 56:1988;787-814.
- (1988) Econometrica , vol.56 , pp. 787-814
- Caplin, A.¹ Nalebuff, B.²

4
- 0000689508
- Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility
- Harsanyi J.C. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. J. Polit. Econ. 63:1955;309-321.
- (1955) J. Polit. Econ. , vol.63 , pp. 309-321
- Harsanyi, J.C.¹

5
- 0000082519
- The foundations of welfare economics
- Hicks J.R. The foundations of welfare economics. Econ. J. 49:1939;696-712.
- (1939) Econ. J. , vol.49 , pp. 696-712
- Hicks, J.R.¹

6
- 0000310992
- Welfare propositions of economics and interpersonal comparisons of utility
- Kaldor N. Welfare propositions of economics and interpersonal comparisons of utility. Econ. J. 49:1939;549-552.
- (1939) Econ. J. , vol.49 , pp. 549-552
- Kaldor, N.¹

7
- 0000791309
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- Kramer G.H. A dynamical model of political equilibrium. J. Econ. Theory. 16:1977;310-334.
- (1977) J. Econ. Theory , vol.16 , pp. 310-334
- Kramer, G.H.¹

8
- 0000661802
- A set of independent, necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision
- May K.O. A set of independent, necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision. Econometrica. 20:1952;680-684.
- (1952) Econometrica , vol.20 , pp. 680-684
- May, K.O.¹

9
- 84971116267
- Decision-rules and individual values in constitutional choice
- Rae D.W. Decision-rules and individual values in constitutional choice. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 63:1969;40-56.
- (1969) Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. , vol.63 , pp. 40-56
- Rae, D.W.¹

10
- 0004048289
- Belknap, Cambridge, MA
- Rawls, J.A., 1971. A Theory of Justice. Belknap, Cambridge, MA.
- (1971) A Theory of Justice
- Rawls, J.A.¹

11
- 0040817763
- The case for bare majority rule
- Reimer M. The case for bare majority rule. Ethics. 62:1951;16-32.
- (1951) Ethics , vol.62 , pp. 16-32
- Reimer, M.¹

12
- 0039039207
- Proof of a theorem on majority rule
- Taylor M.J. Proof of a theorem on majority rule. Behav. Sci. 14:1969;228-231.
- (1969) Behav. Sci. , vol.14 , pp. 228-231
- Taylor, M.J.¹

13
- 0000257301
- Problems of majority voting
- Tullock G. Problems of majority voting. J. Polit. Econ. 67:1959;571-579.
- (1959) J. Polit. Econ. , vol.67 , pp. 571-579
- Tullock, G.¹

14
- 0019679509
- The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributional politics
- Weingast B.R., Shepsle K.A., Johnsen C. The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributional politics. J. Polit. Econ. 89:1981;642-664.
- (1981) J. Polit. Econ. , vol.89 , pp. 642-664
- Weingast, B.R.¹ Shepsle, K.A.² Johnsen, C.³

15
- 4244022174
- Optimal majorities for decisions of varying importance
- Wickström B.-A. Optimal majorities for decisions of varying importance. Public Choice. 48:1986;273-290.
- (1986) Public Choice , vol.48 , pp. 273-290
- Wickström, B.-A.¹

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.