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Volumn 103, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 2328-2351

Managing conflicts in relational contracts

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EID: 84886031061     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.6.2328     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (69)

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