A dynamic theory of war and peace

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 1921-1950

  Yared, Pierre ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric and private information; Contract theory; International political economy; War

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955925433     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.005     Document Type: Article

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