The political economy of indirect control

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 127, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 947-1015

  Padró i Miquel, Gerard ^a   Yared, Pierre ^b  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^b Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS; GOVERNMENT; NUMERICAL MODEL; POLITICAL ECONOMY; TRADE-OFF;

EID: 84860475620     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjs012     Document Type: Article

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