Relational incentives and moral hazard in teams

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 937-963

  Rayo, Luis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; INCENTIVE; MODELING; OPTIMIZATION; PROFITABILITY;

EID: 34250719213     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00443.x     Document Type: Article

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