Relational contracts and the value of relationships

American Economic Review

Volumn 102, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 750-779

  Halac, Marina ^a  

^a 616 Uris Hall ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862496140     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.2.750     Document Type: Review

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