Building routines: Learning, cooperation, and the dynamics of incomplete relational contracts

American Economic Review

Volumn 100, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 448-465

  Chassang, Sylvain ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952386382     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.448     Document Type: Article

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