Multilateral contracting and the employment relationship

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 117, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 1075-1103

  Levin, Jonathan ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036704151     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355302760193968     Document Type: Article

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