Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 44-69

  Mukherjee, Arijit ^a   Vasconcelos, Luis ^b  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951535001     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: 17562171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00125.x     Document Type: Article

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