Executive compensation, supervisory board, and China's governance reform: A legal approach perspective

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 445-471

  Ding, Shujun ^a   Wu, Zhenyu ^b   Li, Yuanshun ^c   Jia, Chunxin ^d  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

^c RYERSON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^d PEKING UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Legal approach; Supervisory boards

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958500321     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-010-0168-1     Document Type: Article

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