Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China

Asia Pacific Journal of Management

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 401-425

  Adithipyangkul, Pattarin ^a   Alon, Ilan ^b   Zhang, Tianyu ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b ROLLINS COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Firm performance; Non cash compensation; Perks; Perquisites

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955010443     PISSN: 02174561     EISSN: 15729958     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10490-009-9162-3     Document Type: Article

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