Non-monetary incentives and opportunistic behavior: Evidence from a laboratory public good game

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 1374-1388

  Dugar, Subhasish ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874394734     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00422.x     Document Type: Article

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