Industry structure, executive pay, and short-termism

Management Science

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 402-419

  Thanassoulis, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bankers' pay; Bonuses; Compensation; Deferred pay; Moral hazard; Myopia; Remuneration; Vested pay

Indexed keywords

BANKERS' PAY; BONUSES; DEFERRED PAY; MORAL HAZARD; MYOPIA; REMUNERATION; VESTED PAY;

COMPENSATION (PERSONNEL); EMPLOYMENT; OPHTHALMOLOGY; PROFITABILITY; RISK MANAGEMENT; STRUCTURAL OPTIMIZATION;

INDUSTRY;

EID: 84874180137     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1601     Document Type: Article

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