Short-term termination without deterring long-term investment: A theory of debt and buyouts

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 81-101

  Edmans, Alex ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Leverage; Liquidation; Managerial myopia; Private equity; Termination

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860390158     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.11.005     Document Type: Article

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