Agency Problems and Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 60, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 406-433

  Schneider, Henry S ^a  

^a Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867684410     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: 14676451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2012.00485.x     Document Type: Article

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