Credence goods monopolists

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 375-389

  Emons, Winand ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Credence goods; D45; D82; Expert services; Incentives; L15

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035545368     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00023-5     Document Type: Article

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