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Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 113-130

When do experts cheat and whom do they target?

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EID: 21644439753     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (75)

References (13)
  • 1
    • 84860968899 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A theory of fraud and over-consumption in experts markets
    • Department of Economics, Boston College
    • ALGER, I. AND SALANIÉ, F. "A Theory of Fraud and Over-Consumption in Experts Markets." Working Paper no. 495, Department of Economics, Boston College, 2003.
    • (2003) Working Paper No. 495 , vol.495
    • Alger, I.1    Salanié, F.2
  • 2
  • 3
    • 0002829174 scopus 로고
    • Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
    • DARBY, M.R. AND KARNI, E. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 16 (1973), pp. 67-88.
    • (1973) Journal of Law and Economics , vol.16 , pp. 67-88
    • Darby, M.R.1    Karni, E.2
  • 4
    • 0023988465 scopus 로고
    • Demand inducement and the physician/patient relationship
    • DRANOVE, D. "Demand Inducement and the Physician/Patient Relationship." Economic Inquiry, Vol. 26 (1988), pp. 281-298.
    • (1988) Economic Inquiry , vol.26 , pp. 281-298
    • Dranove, D.1
  • 5
    • 0031481976 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Credence goods and fraudulent experts
    • EMONS, W. "Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), pp. 107-119.
    • (1997) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.28 , pp. 107-119
    • Emons, W.1
  • 8
    • 0032384419 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An empirical examination of moral hazard in the vehicle inspection market
    • HUBBARD, T.N. "An Empirical Examination of Moral Hazard in the Vehicle Inspection Market." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 29 (1998), pp. 406-426.
    • (1998) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.29 , pp. 406-426
    • Hubbard, T.N.1
  • 9
    • 0038135315 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Second opinions and price competition: Inefficiency in the market for expert advice
    • PESENDORFER, W. AND WOLINSKY, A. "Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice." Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70 (2003), pp. 417-437.
    • (2003) Review of Economic Studies , vol.70 , pp. 417-437
    • Pesendorfer, W.1    Wolinsky, A.2
  • 10
    • 0000274187 scopus 로고
    • Honesty in a model of strategic information
    • PITCHIK, C. AND SCHOTTER, A. "Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information." American Economic Review, Vol. 77 (1987), pp. 1032-1036.
    • (1987) American Economic Review , vol.77 , pp. 1032-1036
    • Pitchik, C.1    Schotter, A.2
  • 11
    • 0346248723 scopus 로고
    • Information transmission in regulated markets
    • _ AND _. "Information Transmission in Regulated Markets." Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 26 (1993), pp.815-829.
    • (1993) Canadian Journal of Economics , vol.26 , pp. 815-829
  • 12
    • 84937282962 scopus 로고
    • The economics of breakdowns, checkups, and cures
    • TAYLOR, C.R. "The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 103 (1995), pp. 53-74.
    • (1995) Journal of Political Economy , vol.103 , pp. 53-74
    • Taylor, C.R.1
  • 13
    • 21844525432 scopus 로고
    • Competition in a market for informed experts' services
    • WOLINSKY, A. "Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 24 (1993), pp.380-398.
    • (1993) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.24 , pp. 380-398
    • Wolinsky, A.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.