Market distortions when agents are better informed: The value of information in real estate transactions

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 90, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 599-611

  Levitt, Steven D ^a   Syverson, Chad ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 55549123025     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: 15309142     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/rest.90.4.599     Document Type: Article

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