On doctors, mechanics, and computer specialists: The economics of credence goods

Journal of Economic Literature

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 5-42

  Dulleck, Uwe ^a,b   Kerschbamer, Rudolf ^c  

^a JOHANNES KEPLER UNIVERSITY LINZ   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^c UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645766738     PISSN: 00220515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/002205106776162717     Document Type: Review

References (29)

1. Alger, Ingela, and François Salanié. 2003. "A Theory of Fraud and Over-Consumption in Experts Markets." Boston College. Mimeo.
2. Akerlof, George A. 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3): 488-500.
3. Darby, Michael R., and Edi Karni. 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud." Journal of Law and Economics, 16(1): 67-88.
4. Dulleck, Uwe, and Rudolf Kerschbamer. 2005a. "Experts vs. Discounters - Competition and Market Unravelling When Customers Do Not Know What They Need." University of Vienna. Mimeo.
5. Dulleck, Uwe, and Rudolf Kerschbamer. 2005b. "Price Discrimination Via the Choice of Distribution Channels." University of Vienna Department of Economics Working Paper 0511.
6. Ely, Jeffrey C., Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine. 2005. "When is Reputation Bad?" UCLA. Levine's Working Paper Archive.
7. Ely, Jeffrey C., and Juuso Välimäki. 2003. "Bad Reputation." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3): 785-814
8. Emons, Winand. 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts." RAND Journal of Economics, 28(1): 107-19.
9. Emons, Winand. 2001. "Credence Goods Monopolists." International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19(3-4): 375-89.
10. Fong, Yuk-Fai. 2005. "When Do Experts Cheat and Whom Do They Target?" Rand Journal of Economics, 36(1): 113-30.
11. Fuchs, Victor R. 1978. "The Supply of Surgeons and the Demand for Operations." Journal of Human Resources, 13: 35-56.
12. Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge and London: MIT Press.
13. Glazer, Jacob, and Thomas G. McGuire. 1996. "Price Contracts and Referrals in Markets for Services." Tel Aviv University Working Paper 10/96.
14. Gruber, Jon, John Kim, and Dina Mayzlin. 1999. "Physician Fees and Procedure Intensity: The Case of Cesarean Delivery." Journal of Health Economics, 18(4): 473-90.
15. Hughes, David, and Brian Yule. 1992. "The Effect of Per-Item Fees on the Behaviour of General Practitioners." Journal of Health Economics, 11(4): 413-37.
16. Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
17. Myerson, Roger B. 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
18. Nelson, Phillip. 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior." Journal of Political Economy, 78(2): 311-29.
19. Park, In-Uck. 2005. "Cheap-Talk Referrals of Differentiated Experts in Repeated Relationships." Rand Journal of Economics, 36(2): 391-411.
20. Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, and Asher Wolinsky. 2003. "Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice." Review of Economic Studies, 70(2): 417-37.
21. Pitchik, Carolyn, and Andrew Schotter. 1987. "Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission." American Economic Review, 77(5): 1032-36.
22. Pitchik, Carolyn, and Andrew Schotter. 1988. "Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission: Correction." American Economic Review, 78(5): 1164.
23. Pitchik, Carolyn, and Andrew Schotter. 1993. "Information Transmission in Regulated Markets." Canadian Journal of Economics, 26(4): 815-29.
24. Richardson, Hugh. 1999. "The Credence Good Problem and the Organization of Health Care Markets." Texas A&M University. Mimeo.
25. Sülzle, Kai, and Achim Wambach. 2005. "Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods. "Journal of Risk and Insurance, 72(1): 159-76.
26. Taylor, Curtis R. 1995. "The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures." Journal of Political Economy, 103(1): 53-74.
27. Tirole, Jean. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge and London: MIT Press.
28. Wolinsky, Asher. 1993. "Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services." RAND Journal of Economics, 24(3): 380-98.
29. Wolinsky, Asher. 1995. "Competition in Markets for Credence Goods." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 151(1): 117-31.