Altruism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 61, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 409-427

  Palfrey, Thomas R ^a   Prisbrey, Jeffrey E ^b,c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^c FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION   (United States)

Author keywords

Errors; Experiments; Learning; Public goods; Reputation; Voluntary contributions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030240160     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01544-2     Document Type: Article

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