A theory of fraud and overtreatment in experts markets

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 853-881

  Alger, Ingela ^a   Salanié, François ^b  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750436252     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00120.x     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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