Varieties of agents in agent-based computational economics: A historical and an interdisciplinary perspective

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 1-25

  Chen, Shu Heng ^a  

^a NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Autonomous agents; Cellular automata; Cognitive capacity; Genetic algorithms; Genetic programming; Tournaments

Indexed keywords

EID: 84866323485     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.003     Document Type: Short Survey

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