When do markets with simple agents fail?

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 865-871

  Othman, Abraham ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Market Equilibrium; Market Failure; Prediction Markets; Price Theory; Zero Intelligence

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; FORECASTING; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

MARKET EQUILIBRIA; MARKET FAILURES; PREDICTION MARKETS; PRICE THEORY; ZERO INTELLIGENCES;

COMMERCE;

EID: 82955245045     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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