Investment behavior under Knightian uncertainty - An evolutionary approach

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 23, Issue 9-10, 1999, Pages 1587-1604

  Lensberg, Terje ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

Bayesian rationality; Genetic programming; Knightian uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033195251     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1889(98)00085-2     Document Type: Article

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