An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 93-122

  Arifovic, Jasmina ^a   McKelvey, Richard D ^c   Pevnitskaya, Svetlana ^b  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

Detectors; Emulators; Learning models; Repeated games; Turing tournament

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748904941     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.013     Document Type: Article

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