Individual Differences in EWA Learning with Partial Payoff Information

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 525, 2008, Pages 37-59

  Ho, Teck H ^a   Wang, Xin ^b   Camerer, Colin F ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY;

EID: 37749037694     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02103.x     Document Type: Article

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