A survey on experimental beauty contest games: Bounded rationality and learning

Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport

Volumn , Issue , 2019, Pages 105-142

  Nagel, Rosemarie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

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EID: 85079316491     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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