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Volumn 5, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 504-523

Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing

Author keywords

Agent based computational economics; Capacity; Concentration; Efficiency; Genetic algorithm social learning; Individual reinforcement learning; Market power; Repeated double auction; Restructuring; Wholesale electricity market

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; COST ACCOUNTING; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION; GENETIC ALGORITHMS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 0035481191     PISSN: 1089778X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/4235.956714     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (317)

References (27)
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  • 10
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    • Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory price auctions in the England and Wales electricity market
    • (2001) J. Econom. Dyn. Control , vol.25 , Issue.3-4 , pp. 561-592
    • Bower, J.1    Bunn, D.2
  • 18
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    • Allocative efficiency of markets with zero-intelligence traders: Market as a partial substitute for individual rationality
    • (1993) J. Pol. Econom. , vol.101 , pp. 119-137
    • Gode, D.K.1    Sunder, S.2
  • 24
    • 0001838252 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning and its consequences for computational analyzes
    • (2000) J. Econom. Dyn. Control , vol.24 , pp. 1-19
    • Vriend, N.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.