Presidential Address: The Corporation in Finance

Journal of Finance

Volumn 67, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 1173-1217

  Rajan, Raghuram G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864067194     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01745.x     Document Type: Article

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