Liquidity risk, liquidity creation, and financial fragility: A theory of banking

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 109, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 287-327

  Diamond, D W ^a   Rajan, R G ^a  

^a Univ Chic Nat Bureau Eco Res   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; LENDING BEHAVIOR; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0034988947     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/319552     Document Type: Article

References (30)

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16. Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector
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18. Demand deposits, trading restrictions, and risk sharing
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24. Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market equilibrium approach