Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms: Empirical evidence

Journal of Finance

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 169-197

  Hellmann, Thomas ^a   Puri, Manju ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013118760     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00419     Document Type: Article

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