The Internal Governance of Firms

Journal of Finance

Volumn 66, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 689-720

  Acharya, Viral V ^a   Myers, Stewart C ^b   Rajan, Raghuram G ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MIT and NBER   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956264841     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01649.x     Document Type: Article

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