Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining

American Economic Review

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 195-222

  Stole, Lars A ^a   Zwiebel, Jeffrey ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING GAME; INTRAFIRM BARGAINING; ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN; TECHNOLOGY CHOICE; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0029822255     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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