A theory of firm scope

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 125, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 483-513

  Hart, Oliver ^a   Holmstrom, Bengt ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951941761     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.2.483     Document Type: Article

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