Peer firms in relative performance evaluation

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 69-89

  Albuquerque, Ana ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; Peer group; Relative performance evaluation

Indexed keywords

EID: 70249123455     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.04.001     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Abowd J., and Kaplan D. Executive compensation: six questions that need answering. Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 (1999) 145-168
2. Aggarwal R., and Samwick A. The other side of the trade-off: the impact of risk on executive compensation. Journal of Political Economy 107 (1999) 65-105
3. Aggarwal R., and Samwick A. Executive compensation, strategic competition, and relative performance evaluation: theory and evidence. Journal of Finance 54 (1999) 1999-2043
4. Albuquerque, A., 2006. Essays in relative performance evaluation. Ph.D Dissertation, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY.
5. Antle R., and Smith A. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Journal of Accounting Research 24 (1986) 1-39
6. Baber W., Janakiraman S., and Kang S. Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21 (1996) 297-318
7. Baker G. Distortion and risk in optimal incentive contracts. Journal of Human Resources 37 (2002) 728-751
8. Baker G., and Hall B. CEO incentives and firm size. Journal of Labor Economics 22 (2004) 767-798
9. Ball R., and Shivakumar L. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (2004) 83-128
10. Bannister J., and Newman H. Analysis of corporate disclosures on relative performance evaluation. Accounting Horizons 17 (2003) 235-246
11. Bannister, J., Newman, H., Weintrop, J., 2004. Tests for relative performance evaluation based on assumptions derived from proxy statement disclosures. Working paper, University of Hartford, West Hartford, CT.
12. Barro J., and Barro R. Pay, performance, and turnover of bank CEOs. Journal of Labor Economics 8 (1990) 448-481
13. Becker R., and Henderson V. Effects of air quality regulations on polluting industries. Journal of Political Economy 108 (2000) 379-421
14. Bertrand M., and Mullainathan S. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2001) 901-932
15. Blackwell D., Brickley J., and Weisbach M. Accounting information and internal performance evaluation: evidence from Texas banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1994) 331-358
16. Brickley J., Smith C., and Zimmerman J. Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture (2001), Irwin, McGraw-Hill, Burr Ridge, IL, New York
17. Bushman R., and Smith A. Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 32 (2001) 237-333
18. Cohen J., and Cohen P. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (1983), Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ
19. Core J., and Guay W. The use of equity grants to manage optimal incentive levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28 (1999) 151-184
20. Core, J., Guay, W., 2003. When efficient contracts require risk-averse executives to hold equity: implications for option valuation, for relative performance evaluation and for the corporate governance debate. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
21. Core J., Guay W., and Verrecchia R. Price versus non-price performance measures in optimal CEO compensation contracts. The Accounting Review 78 (2003) 957-981
22. Core J., Holthausen R., and Larcker D. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (1999) 371-406
23. Coughlan A., and Schmidt R. Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 (1985) 43-66
24. DeFond M., and Park C. The effect of competition on CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27 (1999) 35-56
25. Denis D., Denis D., and Sarin A. Agency problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversification. The Journal of Finance 52 (1997) 135-160
26. Dye R. Relative performance evaluation and project selection. Journal of Accounting Research 30 (1992) 27-52
27. Fama E., and French K. The cross-section of expected stock returns. The Journal of Finance 47 (1992) 427-465
28. Fama E., and French K. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Finance 33 (1993) 3-56
29. Fama E., and French K. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics 43 (1997) 153-193
30. Fazzari S., Hubbard R., and Peterson B. Financing constraints and corporate investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1988) 141-195
31. Gao, F., Wu, J., Zimmerman, J., 2008. Unintended consequences of granting small firms exemptions from securities regulation: evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming.
32. Garvey G., and Milbourn T. Incentive compensation when executives can hedge the market: evidence of relative performance evaluation in the cross section. The Journal of Finance 58 (2003) 1557-1581
33. Garvey G., and Milbourn T. Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: executives are rewarded for good Luck but not penalized for bad. Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2006) 197-226
34. Gertler M., and Gilchrist S. Monetary policy, business cycles, and the behavior of small manufacturing firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1994) 309-340
35. Gibbons R., and Murphy K.J. Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (1990) 30-51
36. Hall B., and Liebman J. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats?. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1998) 653-691
37. Hall B., and Murphy K.J. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options?. American Economic Review 90 (2000) 209-214
38. Hall B., and Murphy K.J. Stock options for undiversified executives. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (2002) 3-42
39. Himmelberg, C., Hubbard, R., 2000. Incentive pay and the market for CEOs: an analysis of pay-for-performance sensitivity. Working paper, Columbia University, New York, NY.
40. Holmstrom B. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982) 324-340
41. Holmstrom B., and Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55 (1987) 303-328
42. Janakiraman S., Lambert R., and Larcker D. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 30 (1992) 53-69
43. Jensen M., and Murphy K. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990) 225-264
44. Jenter, D., Kanaan, F., 2006. CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation. Working paper, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
45. Joh S. Strategic managerial incentive compensation in Japan: relative performance evaluation and product market collusion. Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (1999) 303-313
46. Kaplan S., and Zingales L. Do financing constraints explain why investment is correlated with cash flow?. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997) 169-215
47. Kogut B., and Kulatilaka N. Operating flexibility, global manufacturing, and the option value of a multinational network. Management Science 40 (1994) 123-139
48. Lambert R., and Larcker D. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25 (1987) 85-125
49. Leone A., Wu J., and Zimmerman J. Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42 (2006) 167-192
50. Lev B. On the association between operating leverage and risk. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 9 (1974) 627-641
51. Lys T., and Sabino J. Research design issues in grouping-based tests. Journal of Financial Economics 32 (1992) 355-387
52. Mandelker G., and Rhee S.G. The impact of the degrees of operating and financial leverage on systematic risk of common stock. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 19 (1984) 45-57
53. Murphy, K.J., 1999. Executive compensation. In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3.
54. Murphy K.J., and Zimmerman J. Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (1993) 273-315
55. Oyer P. Why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects?. The Journal of Finance 59 (2004) 1619-1649
56. Parrino R. CEO turnover and outside succession: a cross-sectional analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 46 (1997) 165-197
57. Perez-Quiros G., and Timmermann A. Firm size and cyclical variations in stock returns. Journal of Finance 55 (2000) 1229-1262
58. Prendergast C. The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature 37 (1999) 7-63
59. Rajgopal S., Shevlin T., and Zamora V. CEOs' outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. Journal of Finance 61 (2006) 1813-1844
60. Rosen S. Authority control and distribution of earnings. Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982) 311-323
61. Sloan R. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (1993) 55-100
62. Smith C., and Watts R. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32 (1992) 263-292
63. Thomas L. Regulation and firm size: FDA impacts on innovation. The RAND Journal of Economics 4 (1990) 497-517
64. Warner J., Watts R., and Wruck K. Stock prices and top management changes. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 461-492
65. Watts R. Conservatism in accounting. Part 1: explanations and implications. Accounting Horizons 17 (2003) 207-221
66. Watts R. Conservatism in accounting. Part 2: explanations and implications. Accounting Horizons 17 (2003) 287-301