Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary economics: Are they different species?

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 345-366

  Hodgson, Geoffrey M ^a   Huang, Kainan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

^b SHANDONG UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Causal explanation; Evolutionary economics; Evolutionary game theory; Technique versus substance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859831222     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-010-0203-3     Document Type: Article

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