Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 253, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 131-141

  Jäger, Gerhard ^a  

^a BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Costly signaling; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary stability; Neutral stability; Signaling games

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; SIGNALING;

ARTICLE; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DYNAMICS; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM; GAME; PERCEPTIVE DISCRIMINATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

ANIMALS; COMMUNICATION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; POPULATION DYNAMICS;

EID: 44749095037     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.02.039     Document Type: Article

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