On the institutional foundations of law: The insufficiency of custom and private ordering

Journal of Economic Issues

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 143-166

  Hodgson, Geoffrey ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Custom; Friedrich Hayek; Law; Private ordering; Spontaneous order; The state

Indexed keywords

EID: 67650792739     PISSN: 00213624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624430107     Document Type: Article

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