The structural evolution of morality

The Structural Evolution of Morality

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-300

  Alexander, J Mckenzie ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929759530     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511550997     Document Type: Book

References (107)

1. Alexander, J. McKenzie. (2000). “Evolutionary explanations of distributive justice.” Philosophy of Science 67: 490-516.
2. Alexander, J. McKenzie. (2003) “Random Boolean networks and evolutionary game theory.” Philosophy of Science 70: 1289-1304.
3. Alexander, J. and B. Skyrms. (1999). “Bargaining with neighbors: is justice contagious?”. Journal of Philosophy 96(11): 588-598.
4. Allais, M. and O. Hagen, eds. (1979). Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
5. Allais, M. F. C. (1953a). “La psychologie de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: la théorie et l’experience.” Journal de la Société Statistique de Paris94: 47-73.
6. Allais, M. F. C. (1953b). “Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’ecole americaine.” Econometrica 21, 4: 503-546.
7. Allais, M. F. C. (1953c). “L’extension des théories de l’equilibre économique général et du rendement social au cas du risque.” Econometrica 21, 2: 269-290.
8. Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
9. Axelrod, R. (1986). “An evolutionary approach to norms.” American Political Science Review 80, 4: 1095-1111.
10. Axelrod, R. and W. D. Hamilton (1981). “The evolution of cooperation.” Science 211, 27: 1390-1396.
11. Barlow, N., ed. (1887). The Autobiography of Charles Darwin. New York: Norton.
12. Bell, D. E. Barlow, N., (1982). “Regret in decision making under uncertainty.” Operations Research 30: 961-981.
13. Bereby-Meyer, Y. and I. Erev (1998). “On learning to become a successful loser: a comparison of alternative abstractions of the learning process in the loss domain.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42: 266-286.
14. Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Binmore, K., A. Shaked, and J. Sutton (1985). “Testing noncooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study.” The American Economic Review 75, 5: 1178-1180.
16. Binmore, K., A. Shaked, and J. Sutton (1988). “A further test of noncooperative bargaining theory: reply.” The American Economic Review 78, 4: 837-839.
17. Binmore, K., J. Swierzbinski, S. Hsu, and C. Proulx (1993). “Focal points and bargaining.” International Journal of Game Theory 22: 381-409.
18. Björnerstedt, J. (1993). “Experimentation, imitation, and evolutionary dynamics.” Mimeo. Department of Economics, Stockholm University.
19. Björnerstedt, J. and J. Weibull (1999). “Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation,” in K. J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, and M. Perlman, eds., The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. New York: St. Martin's Press.
20. Bögers, T. and R. Sarin (1993). “Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics.” Journal of Economic Theory 77, 1: 1-14.
21. Braithwaite, R. B. (1954). Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (An inaugural lecture delivered in Cambridge on December 2, 1954.)
22. Curley, E. (1994). Leviathan. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., Introduction.
23. D’Arms, J. (2000). “When evolutionary game theory explains morality, what does it explain?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7, 1-2: 296-299.
24. D’Arms, J., R. Batterman, and K. Górny (1998). “Game theoretic explanations and the evolution of justice.” Philosophy of Science 65: 76-102.
25. Darwin, C. (2004). The Descent of Man. London: Penguin. (Second edition originally published 1879.)
26. Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
27. de Groot, A. D. (1965). Thought and Choice in Chess. The Hague: Mouton.
28. de Waal, F. B. M. (1996). Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. London: Harvard University Press.
29. de Waal, F. B. M.(1998). Chimpanzee Politics. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
30. de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). Our Inner Ape: A Noble, Nasty, and Naughty Heritage. New York: Riverhead.
31. Durrett, R. and S. Levin (1994). “The importance of being discrete (and spatial).” Theoretical Population Biology 46: 363-394.
32. Eddington, A. (1924). Mathematical Theory of Relativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
33. Ellison, G. (1993). “Learning, local interaction and coordination.” Econometrica 61: 1047-1071.
34. Ellison, G. (2000). “Basins of attraction and long run equilibria.” Review of Economic Studies 67: 17-45.
35. Epstein, J. A. (1998). “Zones of cooperation in demographic prisoner's dilemma.” Complexity 4, 2: 36-48.
36. Falk, R. (2000). “The gene - a concept in tension,” in P. Beurton, R. Falk, and H.-J. Rheinberger, eds., The Concept of the Gene in Development and Evolution. Historical and Epistemological Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 317-348.
37. Fisher, R. A. (1930). The Genetical Theory ofNatural Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
38. Fletcher, J. A. and M. Zwick (2000). “N-Player prisoner's dilemma in multiple groups: a model of multilevel selection,” in C. C. Maley and E. Boudreau, eds., Artifical Life VII Workshop Proceedings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 86-89.
39. Foster, D. and H. Peyton Young (1990). “Stochastic evolutionary dynamics.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 38, 219-232.
40. Friedman, M. (1953). “The methodology of positive economics,” in Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
41. Galan, J. M. and L. R. Izquierdo (2005). “Appearances can be deceiving: lessons learned re-implementing Axelrod's ‘evolutionary approach to norms’.” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 8, 3.
42. Gale, J., K. G. Binmore, and L. Samuelson (1995). “Learning to be imperfect: the ultimatum game.” Games and Economic Behavior 8: 56-90.
43. Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books.
44. Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
45. Gigerenzer, G. and R. Selten, eds. (2001). Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
46. Gigerenzer, G., P. M. Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999). Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
47. Güth, W., R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze (1982). “An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 367388.
48. Güth, W. and R. Tietz (1990). “Ultimatum bargaining behavior: a survey and comparision of experimental results.” Journal of Economic Psychology 11: 417-449.
49. Hardin, R. (1997). One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
50. Harris, S. (1981). What's so Funny about Science? Los Altos, CA: W. Kaufmann.
51. Harsanyi, J. and R. Selten (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
52. Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles et al. eds. (2004). Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-scale Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
53. Huberman, B. A. and N. S. Glance (1993). “Evolutionary games and computer simulations.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 90: 7716-7718.
54. Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky (1975). “Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem.” Econometrica 43: 513-518.
55. Kandori, M., G. J. Mailath, and R. Rob (1993). “Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games.” Econometrica 61, 1: 29-56.
56. Kauffman, S. (1993). The Origins of Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
57. Kavka, G. S. (1986). Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
58. Kitcher, P. (1999). “Games social animals play: commentary on Brian Skyrms’ Evolution of the Social Contract.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, 1: 221-228.
59. Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Reprinted 1994, Oxford: Blackwell.
60. Lindgren, K. and M. G. Nordahl (1994). “Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games.” Physica D 75: 292-309.
61. Loomes, G. and R. Sugden (1982). “Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty.” Economic Journal 92: 805-824.
62. Luce, R. D. and H. Raiffa (1957). Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
63. Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
64. Maynard Smith, J. and G. Price (1973). “The logic of animal conflict.” Nature 246: 15-18.
65. Milgram, S. (1967). “The small world problem.” Psychology Today 2: 60-67.
66. Milinski, M. (1987). “Tit for tat in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.” Nature 325: 433-434.
67. Morris, S. (2000). “Contagion.” Review of Economic Studies 67: 57-78.
68. Moss, L. (2003). What Genes Can’t Do. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
69. Nash, J. (1950a). “Equilibrium points in N-person games.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 36: 48-49.
70. Nash, J. (1951a). Essays on Game Theory. Reprinted 1996, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
71. Nash, J (1951b). “Non-cooperative games.” Annals of Mathematics 54, 2: 286-295.
72. Nash, J. F. (1950b). “The bargaining problem.” Econometrica 18: 155-162.
73. Newell, A. and H. A. Simon (1972). Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
74. Nowak, M. and K. Sigmund (1993). “A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.” Nature 364: 56-58.
75. Nowak, M. A. and R. M. May (1992). “Evolutionary games and spatial chaos.” Nature 359: 826-829.
76. Nowak, M. A. and R. M. May (1993). “The spatial dilemmas of evolution.” International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 3, 1: 35-78.
77. Nydegger, R. V. and G. Owen (1974). “Two-person bargaining: an experimental test of the Nash axioms.” International Journal of Game Theory 3, 4: 239-249.
78. Page, K. M., M. A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund (2000). “The spatial ultimatum game.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B. 267: 2177-2182.
79. Prasad, K. (1991). “Computability and randomness of Nash equilibrium in infinite games.” Journal of Mathematica Economics 20: 429-442.
80. Prasad, K. (1997). “On the computability of Nash equilibria.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21: 943-953.
81. Ridley, M. (1996). The Origins of Virtue. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
82. Roth, A. E. (1995). “Bargaining Experiments”. In J. Kagel and A. Roth, eds., The Handboo of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chapter 4, pp. 253-348.
83. Rousseau, J.-J. (1755). Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1999 edition. Franklin Philip, translator.
84. Ryle, G. (1971). “The thinking of thoughts: what is ‘le penseur’ doing?” In Collected Papers of Gilbert Ryle. London: Hutchinson.
85. Sadrieh, A., W. Güth, P. Hammerstein et al. (2001). “Group report: is there evidence for an adaptive toolbox?,” in G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten, eds., Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, chapter 6, pp. 83-102.
86. Sarkar, S. (1998). Genetics and Reductionism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
87. Sen, A. (1967). “Isolation, assurance, and the social rate of discount.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 81: 112-124.
88. Shermer, M. (2004). The Science of Good and Evil. New York: Times Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC.
89. Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of Man: Social and Rational. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
90. Skiena, S. (1990). “Graph isomorphism,” section 5.2 in Implementing Discrete Mathematics: Combinatorics and Graph Theory with Mathematica. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 181-187.
91. Skyrms, B. (1992). “Chaos in game dynamics.” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 1: 111-130.
92. Skyrms, B. (1993). “Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: strange attractors in evolutionary game dynamics,” in Proceedings of the 1992 PSA, volume 2, pp. 374-394.
93. Skyrms, B. (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
94. Skyrms, B. (2003). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
95. Skyrms, B. and R. Pemantle (2000). “A dynamic model of social network formation.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States97, 16: 9340-9346.
96. Taylor, P. D. and L. B. Jonker (1978). “Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics.” Mathematical Biosciences 40: 145-156.
97. Thaler, R. H. (1988). “Anomalies: the ultimatum game.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 4: 195-206.
98. Vanderschraaf, P. and J. McKenzie Alexander (2005). “Follow the leader: local interactions with influence neighborhoods.” Philosophy of Science 72: 86-113.
99. von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
100. Watts, D. J. (1999). Small World: The Dynamics of Networks between Order and Randomness. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
101. Watts, D. J. and S. H. Strogatz (1998). “Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks.” Nature 393, 4: 440-442.
102. Weibull, J. W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
103. Wilson, E. O. (1988). On Human Nature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
104. Wuensche, A. and M. J. Lesser (1992). The Global Dynamics of Cellular Automata: An Atlas of Basin of Attraction Fields of One-Dimensional Cellular Automata, volume 1 of Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity. New York: Addison-Wesley.
105. Yaari, M. E. and M. Bar-Hillel (1984). “On dividing justly.” Social Choice and Welfare 1: 1-24.
106. Young, H. Peyton (1993). “The evolution of conventions.” Econometrica 61, 1: 57-84. (1998).
107. Young, H. Peyton Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory ofInstitu- tions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.