Finite populations choose an optimal language

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 249, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 606-616

  Pawlowitsch, Christina ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Evolutionary stability; Fixation probabilities; Language evolution; Moran process

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; EVOLUTION; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; GAME THEORY; LANGUAGE; MAPPING; POPULATION SIZE;

ARTICLE; COMMUNICATION SKILL; EVOLUTION; HUMAN; LANGUAGE ABILITY; POPULATION SIZE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY;

EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; LANGUAGE; LINGUISTICS; MODELS, GENETIC; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; POPULATION DENSITY;

EID: 35748970208     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.08.009     Document Type: Article

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