Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 203-226

  Pawlowitsch, Christina ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Language evolution; Lyapunov stability; Neutral stability; Replicator dynamics; Sender receiver game; Suboptimality

Indexed keywords

EID: 41649095488     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.009     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Aumann R., and Heifetz A. Incomplete information. In: Aumann R., and Hart S. (Eds). Handbook of Game Theory vol. 3 (2002), Elsevier, Amsterdam/New York 1665-1686
2. Bomze I. Regularity vs. degeneracy in dynamics, games, and optimization: A unified approach to different aspects. SIAM Rev. 44 (2002) 394-414
3. Bomze I., and Weibull J. Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?. Games Econ. Behav. 11 (1995) 173-192
4. Cavalli-Sforza L. Genes, peoples, and languages. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 94 (1997) 7719-7724
5. Cressman R. Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games (2003), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
6. Hofbauer J., and Sigmund K. Evolutionary Games and Population dynamics (1998), Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK
7. Hurford J. Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the language acquisition device. Lingua 77 (1989) 187-222
8. Komarova N., and Niyogi P. Optimizing the mutual intelligibility of linguistic agents in a shared world. J. Art. Intell. 154 (2004) 1-42
9. Lewis D. Convention: A Philosophical Study (1969), Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA
10. Maynard Smith J. Evolution and the Theory of Games (1982), Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK
11. Nowak M., and Krakauer D. The evolution of language. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 96 (1999) 8028-8033
12. Nowak M., Plotkin J., and Krakauer D. The evolutionary language game. J. Theoret. Biol. 200 (1999) 147-162
13. Quine W. Truth by convention. In: Lee O. (Ed). Philosophical Essays for A. N. Withhead (1936), Longmans, New York
14. Quine W. Word and Object (1960), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
15. Selten R. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal contests. J. Theoret. Biol. 84 (1980) 93-101
16. Schuster P., Sigmund K., Hofbauer J., and Wolff R. Self-regulation of behavior in animal societies II. Games between two populations without self-interaction. Biol. Cybern. 40 (1981) 9-15
17. Taylor P. Evolutionarily stable strategies for two types of players. J. Appl. Prob. 16 (1979) 76-83
18. Taylor P., and Jonker L. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Math. Biosci. 40 (1978) 145-156
19. Thomas B. On evolutionarily stable sets. J. Math. Biol. 22 (1985) 105-115
20. Trapa P., and Nowak M. Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game. J. Math. Biol. 41 (2000) 172-188
21. Wärneryd K. Cheap talk, coordination and evolutionary stability. Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1993) 532-546
22. White M. Toward Reunion in Philosophy (1956), Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA