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Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 642-658

The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness

Author keywords

Communication; Cooperation; Fairness; Heterogeneity; Honesty; Reciprocity; Social norms

Indexed keywords


EID: 84857655517     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.004     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (24)

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