Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 52-60

  Neugebauer, Tibor ^a   Perote, Javier ^b   Schmidt, Ulrich ^c,d   Loos, Malte ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LUXEMBOURG   (Luxembourg)

^b UNIVERSIDAD REY JUAN CARLOS   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF KIEL   (Germany)

^d KIEL INSTITUTE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Belief formation; Conditional cooperation; Experimental economics; Information feedback; Public goods; Voluntary contributions

Indexed keywords

EID: 58549104318     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2008.04.005     Document Type: Article

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