Maximization and the act of choice

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 745-779

  Sen, Amartya ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Axiomatic choice theory; Choice act; Games and common knowledge of norms; Incomplete preference ranking; Maximizing behavior; Rational choice; Satisficing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001202145     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171939     Document Type: Article

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