Optimal corporate governance and compensation in a dynamic world

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 480-521

  Noe, Thomas H ^a   Rebello, Michael J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

G20; G34

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855919844     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhr131     Document Type: Article

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