Managerial legacies, entrenchment, and strategic inertia

Journal of Finance

Volumn 65, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 2403-2436

  Casamatta, Catherine ^a   Guembel, Alexander ^a  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78249244140     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01619.x     Document Type: Article

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