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Volumn 108, Issue 38, 2011, Pages 15739-15744

Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games

Author keywords

Global warming; International climate agreement; Renegotiation proofness

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CARBON FOOTPRINT; CLIMATE CHANGE; GAME; HUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

EID: 80053133836     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1106265108     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (75)

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