A strategic analysis of global warming: Theory and some numbers

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 187-209

  Dutta, Prajit K ^a   Radner, Roy ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Calibration; Dynamic games; Global warming; Treaty

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349265524     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.013     Document Type: Article

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