Renegotiations in the greenhouse

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 573-596

  Weikard, Hans Peter ^a   Dellink, Rob ^a,b   van Ierland, Ekko ^a  

^a WAGENINGEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Coalition formation with renegotiation; International climate agreements; Self enforcing international environmental agreements; STACO model

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; GAS EMISSIONS; GREENHOUSE GASES; POLLUTION CONTROL;

CLIMATE POLICY; COALITION FORMATIONS; INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; KEY FEATURE; SEQUENTIAL GAMES;

CLIMATE MODELS;

ABATEMENT COST; CLIMATE CHANGE; ECOLOGICAL MODELING; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; GREENHOUSE GAS; INCENTIVE; NEGOTIATION PROCESS;

CHINA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 77950690966     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-009-9329-x     Document Type: Article

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