Repeated games with differential time preferences

Econometrica

Volumn 67, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 393-412

  Lehrer, Ehud ^a   Pauzner, Ady ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Different discount factors; Folk theorem; Intertemporal trade; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008798293     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00024     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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